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We derive fundamental new theory for measuring monetary service flows aggregated over countries within a 
multicountry economic union.  We develop three increasingly restrictive approaches:  (1) the heterogeneous 
agents approach, (2) the multilateral representative agent approach, and (3) the unilateral representative agent 
approach.  Our heterogeneous agents approach contains our multilateral representative agent approach as a 
special case.  These results are being used by the European Central Bank in the construction of its Divisia 
monetary aggregates database, with convergence from the most general to the more restrictive approaches 
expected as economic convergence within the euro area proceeds.  Our theory is equally as relevant to other 
economic unions, with or without a common currency. 
 
We use a stochastic approach to aggregation across countries over heterogeneous representative agents.  Our 
theory permits monitoring the effects of policy at the aggregate level over a multicountry economic union, 
while also monitoring the distribution effects of policy among the countries of the multicountry area.  The 
resulting index number theory assures internal consistency of the data construction methodology with the theory 
used in applications of the data in modeling and policy.  
 
 
JEL Classifications:  C43, C82, E41, E51, F31.  Keywords:  Monetary Aggregation, Aggregation over  
Countries, Heterogeneous Agents, Multilateral Aggregation, EMU.  
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With the growth of “free trade” economic and political unions, such as NAFTA and the 
EU, and more profoundly the growth of economic monetary unions, such as the EMU, an 
increasing amount of research effort has focused on index-number-theoretic measurement 
problems associated with economic modeling and conduct of macroeconomic policy in 
such economic unions.
 2  The need for internally consistent recursive aggregation over 
monetary data within and over countries is central to the objectives of that research.  For 
those purposes, this research, unlike prior research on this subject, was conducted in a 
manner that produces direct, multilateral extensions of the available closed-economy 
results.  The theory developed in this paper is currently being used by the European 
Central Bank in the construction of its Divisia monetary aggregates database.  Further 
details of this research, as applied to the euro area, are available in the original ECB 
working paper, Barnett (2003). 
 
Monetary aggregation and index number theory and the broader field of financial 
aggregation and index number theory were first rigorously connected with the literature 
on microeconomic aggregation and index number theory by Barnett (1980,1987).  A 
collection of many of his contributions to that field is available in Barnett and Serletis 
(2000).  But Barnett’s work in those publications was based upon the assumption that the 
data was produced by a single closed economy.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to extend that theory to the multicountry case in a form that 
would be applicable to economic unions, both prior to and after the introduction of a 
common currency.  Progress towards convergence within economic unions occurs 
gradually.  For that reason, our results are produced under a sequence of increasingly 
strong assumptions, beginning with (1) a heterogeneous agents approach applicable to the 
past under reasonable assumptions, and then progressing to (2) a new multilateral 
representative agent approach applicable to an economic union under reasonable 
convergence assumptions, and finally to (3) a unilateral representative agent approach 
requiring very strong assumptions, perhaps relevant to the very distant future, if at all. 
 
At some date following the introduction of a common currency, our heterogeneous agents 
approach could become mathematically equivalent to the multilateral representative agent 
approach, since the assumptions necessary for equivalence of the two approaches are 
reasonably related to the long run objectives of economic monetary unions.  But the far 
more restrictive unilateral representative agent approach requires very strong 
assumptions.  In particular the unilateral representative agent approach would require 
convergence of inflation rates and interest rates across countries and would imply 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., M. M. G. Fase and C. C. A. Winder (1994), Spencer (1997), Wesche (1997), Fase (2000), 
Beyer, Doornik, and Hendry (2001), Stracca (2001), and Reimers (2002).  Two approaches have been 
proposed and applied by other researchers.  One has been called the direct approach and the other the 
indirect approach.  We show that the direct approach implies the existence of our most restrictive, unilateral 
representative agent, which requires assumptions that we consider to be very strong.   The alternative 
indirect approach uses Divisia aggregation within countries and then ad hoc weighting of those within-
country indexes to aggregate over countries.  The indirect approach produces a result that is disconnected 
from theory and does not produce nesting of the multilateral or unilateral representative agent approaches.    
  - 2 -demographic convergence to a homogeneous population, such that the country of 
residence of a consumer would become irrelevant to the unilateral representative agent’s 
decisions. 
 
This paper’s extensions of Barnett’s earlier work produce a number of unexpected 
innovations, including the need for simultaneous use of two different consumer price 
indexes for internal consistency of the theory.  The current paper is intended to solve the 
central theoretical problems associated with monetary aggregation over countries. This 
paper is likely to be the first in a series of papers.  Later papers are planned to incorporate 
risk aversion, with the first step in that direction appearing in Barnett and Wu (2005).  
The solutions of the fundamental problems addressed in the current paper are logically 
prior to our planned future work on this subject. 
 
The purposes and objectives of this research in the multicountry case are analogous to the 
purposes and objectives of monetary and financial aggregation and index number theory 
in the single country case.  Data construction and measurement procedures imply the 
theory that can rationalize those procedures.  Unless that implied theory is internally 
consistent with the theory used in applications of that data in modeling and policy, the 
data and its applications are incoherent.  Such internal inconsistencies can produce the 
appearance of structural change, when there has been none.
3
 
2.  Definition of Variables.  
 
We define an “economic union” to be any multicountry area within which multilateral 
measurement and policy are relevant.  Whether of not a common currency exists within 
the area is not part of this definition, but is relevant to the choice among assumptions we 
introduce.  In practice, the identification of an economic union is usually by political 
treaty.  But in economic theory, existence of such an area can be defined by a weak 
separability clustering condition, which need not imply the existence of a political treaty 
or an “optimal currency area.”
4
 
All results are in continuous time.  Certainty equivalence is assumed within the decisions 
of each consumer, as would be attained under risk neutrality by replacing 
contemporaneously random rates of return by their expectations.   
 




k p k) be the true 
cost of living index in country k∈{1,…,K}, where pk = pk (t) is the vector of prices of 
consumer goods at time t and xk = xk(t) is the vector of per-capita real rates of 
consumption of those goods in country k at time t.  Let Hk = Hk(t) be the population of 
country k at time t, and let mkji be the nominal per capita holdings of asset type i located 
or purchased in country j but owned by economic agents in country k.  The holdings are 
per capita relative to country k’s own population, Hk.  We present all results in per capita 
form, since the per capita variables are the ones that are needed in demand functions at 
                                                 
3 This phenomenon has been called the “Barnett critique” by Chrystal and MacDonald (1994). 
4 See Swofford (2000) and Drake, Mullineux, and Agung (1997). 
  - 3 -the aggregate level.  In addition the correlation with inflation tends to be in terms of per 
capita flows, since increases in monetary services that produce no change in per capita 
monetary services just accommodate population growth.   
 
Assume that asset holders within the economic union also sometimes hold assets in Z 
countries that are outside the economic union.  Let Nj be the number of asset types 
available within country j, and let N be the total number of asset types available within all 
of the relevant countries j∈{1,…,K+Z}, where clearly N≥ Nj for all j∈{1,…,K+Z}.  Then 
the subscripts of mkji have range:  k∈{1,…,K}, j∈{1,…,K+Z}, i∈{1,…,N}.  We are not 
limiting i to be within {1,…,Nj}, since we wish to associate a unique numerical value of i 
to each asset type, regardless of country j within which the asset is located.  As a result, 
for each (k,j) there will necessarily be zero values of mkji for N - Nj values of i.  If 
countries j and k do not share the same currency, then nominal holdings are converted to 
units of country k’s currency using the exchange rate between country k’s and country j’s 
currencies.
5  Then  = m
*
kji m kji/  is the real per capita holdings of asset i located or 




Let rkji = rkji(t) be the holding-period after-tax yield on asset i located or purchased in 
country j and owned by an economic agent in country k at instant of time t, where all 
asset rates of return are yield-curve adjusted to the same holding period (e.g., 30 days).
6  
It is important to recognize that the subscript k identifies the country of residence of the 
asset holder, and not necessarily the country of location of the asset.  Rates of return on 
foreign denominated assets owned by residents of country k are understood to be 
effective rates of return, net of the instantaneous expected percentage rate of change in 
the exchange rate between the domestic and foreign currency.  At some time following 
the introduction of a common currency, the dependency of rates of return upon k can be 
expected to end, and the dependency upon j will be relevant only to holdings within the 
economic union of assets located in the Z countries outside the economic union.  Hence 
at some time after the introduction of a common currency, it follows that rkji will be 
independent of (j,k) for all j, k∈{1,…,K}.   
 
Let Rk = Rk(t) be the benchmark rate of return in country k at instant of time t, where the 
benchmark rate of return is the rate of return received on a pure investment providing no 
services other than its yield.
7  Then  (t)= R
*
kji π k(t)-rkji(t) is the real user cost price of asset i 
located or purchased in country j and owned by residents of country k at time t, and πkji = 
                                                 
5 Similarly we assume that prices of consumer goods are converted to units of country k’s currency.  Since 
aggregation over consumer goods is not the primary subject of this paper, our notation for consumer goods 
quantities, expenditures, and prices is less formal than for monetary assets. 
6 In most cases below, the adjustment for taxation will have no effect, unless the marginal tax rate is not the 
same on assets appearing in the numerator and denominator of the shares.  See Barnett and Serletis (2000, 
p. 20).  The yield curve adjustment of rates of return of different maturities is acquired by subtracting from 
the asset’s yield the country’s Treasury security yield of the same maturity and then adding that yield 
differential onto the Treasury security yield of the chosen holding period.  The same holding period should 
be used for all assets.   
7 See the Appendix and footnotes 17 and 28 to Barnett (2003), regarding construction of a proxy for the 
benchmark rate. 
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k p
*
kji π   is the corresponding nominal user cost.
8  It does not matter whether real or 
nominal interest rates are used, since the inflation rate conversion between nominal and 
real applies to both terms in the user cost formula and hence cancels out between the two 
terms.   
 
Technically speaking, whenever mkji is zero, as often will happen when a particular asset 
type i is not available within country j, the user cost price should be the asset’s 
reservation price in country j.  But in practice, terms containing assets having zero 
quantity will drop out of all of our formulas, except when the asset’s quantity becomes 
nonzero in the next period.  In such cases, the reservation price must be imputed during 
the period preceding the innovation and the new goods introduction procedure must be 
used.
9  Since such innovations are infrequent, it usually will not be necessary to impute a 
reservation price or interest rate to asset holdings for which mkji = 0. 
 
We now define 









mkj= (mkj1,…, mkji,...,mkjN)′, 
rkj = (rkj1,…,rkji,…,rkjN) ′, 









πkj = (πkj1,…, πkji,…, πkjN) ′, 
and let 









mk= (mk1,…, mkj,...,mk,K+Z)′, 
rk = (rk1,…,rkj,…,r k,K+Z)′, 
π







πk = (πk1,…, πkj,…, πk,K+Z) ′. 
                                                 
8 For these formulas and results, see Barnett (1978, section 3; 1980, section 3.2; or 1987, section 2.1).  In 
discrete time, it is necessary to discount to the beginning of the period all interest paid at the end of the 
period.  This requires dividing nominal and real user costs by 1+Rk. 
9 For the new goods introduction procedure, see Barnett and Serletis (2000, p. 77, footnote 25) and 
Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997, pp. 77-78). 
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Aggregation within countries uses the existing theory developed by Barnett (1980, 1987).  
That theory uses the economic approach to index number theory and assumes the 
existence of a representative agent within each country.  To avoid the unnecessary 
imputation of reservation prices to assets not being held by residents of country k, we 
shall restrict most of our computations to the index set Sk =  
{(j,i): mkji>0, j∈{1,…,K+Z}, i∈{1,…,N }} for all k∈{1,…,K}. 
Definition 1:   Within each country k∈{1,…,K}, define the monetary real user-cost price 
aggregate  , the monetary nominal user-cost price aggregate ∏
*
*
k Π k, the real per-capita 
monetary services aggregate  , and the nominal per-capita monetary services 
aggregate M
k M
k by the following Divisia indices: 
d log   = 
*
k Π
k (j,i) S ∈ ∑ wkji d log  , 
* πkji
d log ∏k = 
k (j,i) S ∈ ∑ wkji d log πkji, 
d log   
*
k M=
k (j,i) S ∈ ∑ wkji d log  , 
*
kji m
d log Mk = 



















kk j i k j i
*







kk j i k j i






Observe that 0 ≤ wkji ≤ 1 for all k∈{1,…,K}, j∈{1,…,K+Z}, and i∈{1,…,N}.  Also 





∈ ∑ kji, have the properties 
of a probability distribution for each k∈{1,…,K}, and we could interpret our Divisia 
indexes above as Divisia growth rate means.  But since it is convenient to assume the 
existence of a representative agent within each country, the statistical interpretation as a 
mean is not necessary.  We instead can appeal to the Divisia index’s known ability to 
track the aggregator function of the country’s representative consumer.   
The following result relating nominal to real values follows immediately. 








k p . 
Proof:  Follows from the known linear homogeneity of the Divisia index.   Q.E.D. 
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Our heterogeneous agents approach to aggregation over countries is based upon the 
stochastic convergence approach to aggregation, championed by Theil (1967) and 
developed further by Barnett (1979a,b; 1981, chap. 2).  This approach not only can be 
used to aggregate over heterogeneous consumers, but also jointly over consumers and 
firms.  Hence the approach is not only a heterogeneous consumers approach, but more 
generally is a true heterogeneous agents approach.   See, e.g., Barnett and Serletis (2000, 
pp. 88-90 and chapter 9).  By assuming the existence of a representative agent within 
each country, and treating those representative agents as heterogeneous agents, we 
produce a heterogeneous countries approach to aggregation over countries. 
In aggregating within an economic union, this approach implies that the countries’ 
characteristics, including cultures, tastes, languages, etc., were sampled from underlying 
theoretical populations consistent with the climates, histories, resources, geographies, 
neighboring population characteristics, etc.  All time-varying variables then become 
stochastic processes.  Each Divisia index aggregating over component stochastic 
processes becomes the sample mean of realizations of those stochastic processes, and 
thereby an estimate of the mean function of the underlying unknown population 
stochastic process.  The distributions of those stochastic processes are derived 
distributions induced by the random sampling from country characteristics.  The derived 
empirical distributions of the countries’ solution stochastic-process growth rates impute 
probabilities to countries equal to their relevant expenditure shares in expenditure within 
the economic union. 
Let ek be the exchange rate of country k’s currency relative to a market basket of 
currencies, such as the ecu (European currency unit), where ek is defined in units of the 
market basket currency per unit of country k’s currency.  When extending the data 
backwards to before the introduction of a common currency, the exchange rates can play 
an important role in our results. 
The stochastic convergence approach to aggregation over heterogeneous agents has 
traditionally been based more on statistical theory than on economic theory.  But a 
rigorous connection with economic theory has been provided by Barnett (1979a).  We 
shall use that interpretation in our heterogeneous agents approach, as we now explain.   
Consider a possible country with representative consumer c, having utility function Uc = 
Uc[uc( ), g
*
                                                
c m c(xc)].  Assume that the differences in tastes across possible countries can be 
explained in terms of a vector of taste-determining variables, φc.  The dimension of the 
vector of taste-determining variables must be finite, but otherwise is irrelevant to the 
theory.
10  Then there must exist functions U, u, and g, such that  
Uc=Uc[uc( ),g
*
c m c(xc)] = U[u( ,φ
*
c m c), g(xc, φc), φc] 
 
10 The assumption of finite dimensionality of φc is only for notational convenience.  Without that 
assumption, φc could not be written as a vector.  A sequence or continuum of taste-determining variables 
would not alter any of our conclusions, but would complicate the notation. 
  - 7 -for all possible countries’ tastes, φc.  Although U, u, and g are fixed functions, the random 
vector φc of taste-determining variables causes Uc, uc, and gc to become random 
functions, reflecting the possible variations of tastes and their probabilities, conditionally 
upon their given environmental, demographic, historical, resource, and other factors in 
the economic union. 
Assume that each possible country c’s representative consumer solves the following 
decision problem for ( ,x
*
c m c) at each instant of time t: 
maximize U[u( ,φ
*
c m c), g(xc, φc), φc] 
subject to 
*
cc ′ m π +  cc ′ xp= Ic. 
Assume that the countries and their representative agents are about to be drawn from the 
theoretically possible populations, but have not yet been drawn.  Assume that there is an 
infinite number of possible countries in the economic union, so that there exists a 
continuous joint distribution of the random variables (Ic,pc,ec,πc,φc) at any time t.  We 
assume that φc is sampled at birth and does not change during lifetimes, so that φc is not 
time dependent.  But {Ic(t),pc(t),ec(t),πc(t)} are stochastic processes.  Hence at any time t 
we can write the theoretical population distribution function of {Ic(t),pc(t),ec(t),πc(t), φc} 
at t as Ft.  With distributions derived from Ft, it follows that at any t, the following are 




cc pe cec), d log (M
* ), d log (∏ c cec), and d log (∏ ).  c
Using the derived distribution of those random variables, we can define their theoretical 
population means by θ1 = E[d log ( )], θ cc pe 2 = E[d log (Mcec)], θ3 = E[d log (M
*
c )], θ4 = 
E[d log (∏cec)], and θ5 = E[d log (∏ )], where (θ c 1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5) = (θ1(t), θ2(t), θ3(t), 
θ4(t), θ5(t)) is a nonstochastic function of time.  Now consider sampling from the 
theoretical population K times to draw the k∈{1,…,K} actual countries.  The countries 
are assumed to have representative consumers having characteristics that are produced 
from the continuous theoretical population distribution Ft at t. 
Definition 2:  Let sk = Hk/ be country k’s fraction of total economic union 
















































.    (1) 
The fact that this definition is in terms of total national expenditure shares, rather than per 
capita shares, is evident from the fact that: 
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k W 1,….,WK} as a 
probability distribution in computing the following Divisia means by our stochastic 
heterogeneous-countries approach to aggregation over countries. 
 
Definition 3:  Aggregating over countries, define the monetary-sector-weighted Divisia 
consumer price index, p* = p*(t), by: 
d log p* =  W
K
k1 = ∑ k d log ( ) .               ( 2 )   k
*
ke p
Definition 4:  Define the economic union’s nominal, M, and real, M*, per-capita 
monetary service flows by: 





= ∑ d log (skMkek) 
and 





= ∑ d log (skM ). 
*
k
Definition  5:  Define the economic union’s nominal, ∏, and real, ∏*, monetary user-cost 
prices by 





= ∑ d log (∏kek) 
and 





= ∑ d log (∏ ). 
*
k
When we draw from the derived population distributions, the frequency with which we 
draw d log  , d log (s k ke p
*
→∞
kMkek), d log (skM
* ), d log (∏ k kek), and d log (∏
* ) is W k k.  
From Khinchine’s theorem, assuming independent sampling, we find that d log p*,  
d log M, d log M*, d log ∏, and d log ∏* are sample means of distributions having 
population means equal to θ1(t), θ2(t), θ3(t), θ4 (t), and θ5(t),  respectively.  In addition,  
d log p*, d log M, d log M*, d log ∏, and d log ∏* converge in probability as K  to 
θ1(t), θ2(t), θ3(t), θ4 (t), and θ5(t), respectively.  It is this convergence to theoretical 
  - 9 -population properties that accounts for this aggregation approach’s name, “the stochastic 
convergence approach,” in Barnett (1979a). 
Observe that there is no assumption that a representative agent exists over countries.  We 
assume in this heterogeneous agents approach only that representative agents exist within 
countries.  Aggregation over countries is defined to be estimation of the moments of the 
stochastic processes generated by sampling from the underlying theoretical population 
that produces the countries’ representative agents.  When in later sections we consider the 
existence of multilateral and unilateral representative agents over countries, we add 
strong assumptions about the realized tastes after sampling from the theoretical 
population.   
In summary, the perspective from which our heterogeneous agents approach is produced 
is prior to the drawing from the theoretical distribution, so that random variables have not 
yet been realized and all dynamic solution paths are stochastic processes induced by the 
randomness of {Ic(t),pc(t),ec(t),πc(t),φc}.  No assumptions are made about the precise 
form in which realized tastes relate to each other across countries.  The heterogeneous-
agents approach tracks aggregator functions within countries.  But this approach does not 
require assumptions sufficient for the existence of microeconomic aggregator functions 
over countries.  After aggregating over countries, this approach tracks moments of 
aggregate stochastic processes and is interpreted relative to the underlying population 
distributions. 
In contrast, our multilateral and unilateral representative agent approaches add 
assumptions regarding the functional relationship among realized tastes of countries 
already in existence, and seek to track the realized aggregator function over countries.  
Under those additional assumptions producing the existence of an aggregator function 
over the economic union, the heterogeneous agents approach reduces to the multilateral 
representative agent approach as a special case.  Although the two approaches have 
different interpretations, because of the difference in perspective regarding prior versus 
post sampling, the multilateral economic agent approach is nevertheless mathematically a 
nested special case of the heterogeneous agents approach. 
It is important to recognize the following proof’s dependence upon the definition of p* in 
equation (2), with the share weights determined by Definition 2.  If any other weights, 
such as consumption-expenditure share or GDP weights, had been used in defining p*, 
then Theorem 1 would not hold. 
 
Theorem 1:  M = M*p* and ∏ = ∏*p*. 
 
Proof:  The method of proof is proof by contradiction.   
 
First consider M, and suppose that M ≠ M*p*.  Then 
 
d log M ≠ d log (M*p*) = d log M* + d log p*. 










= ∑ d log (skMk/p
* ) + d log p*.  k










= ∑ d log p
*  + d log p*.  k















= ∑ d log p
*    k





= ∑ d log ek










= ∑ d log (p
* e k k) + d log p* 





= ∑ d log (skMk), 
which is a contradiction.  The last equality follows from equation (2) in Definition 3. 
Now consider ∏, and suppose that ∏ ≠ ∏*p*.  Then 
 
d log ∏ ≠ d log (∏*p*) = d log ∏* + d log p*. 

















= ∑ d log (p e
*
k k). 





















= ∑ d log (p































which  is  a  contradiction.       Q. E. D. 
 
The following theorem proves Fisher’s factor reversal property for the monetary quantity 
and user cost aggregates over countries.  In particular, we prove that total expenditure on 
  - 11 -monetary services aggregated over countries is the same, whether computed from the 
product of the economic union’s quantity and user cost aggregates or from the sum of the 
products within countries.  The multiplications by sk convert to per capita values relative 
to total economic union population, while the within-country aggregates, M , remain per 













Proof:  The method of proof is proof by contradiction.  So assume that 










































































































































Π ∑ ( )
*














But taking the total differential of  , we have 
*
kk kk Ms e Π
d( ) = (∏
*












Π ∑ ( )
*




















= ∑ kk e Π
which  is  a  contradiction.         Q.E.D. 
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We now consider some special cases of our results.  First we consider the case of 
purchasing power parity.  While the purchasing power parity assumption is not applicable 
to many economic unions, this special case is useful in understanding the forms of the 
more general formulas we have derived without purchasing power parity and could be 
useful in applying this theory to other economic unions in which purchasing power parity 
may apply. 
 
5.1  Purchasing Power Parity 
 
Definition 6:  We define E = {ek:  k = 1,…., K} to satisfy purchasing power parity, if 
*
j p /  = e
*
i p i/ej for all countries i, j∈{1,…., K}.  Under this definition, it equivalently 




i p i = 
*
j p ej for all i, j∈{1,…., K}. 
 











Π ∑ κκ κ
κ
.          ( 3 )  
 
Proof:  See Barnett (2003). 
 
Theorem 4:  If E satisfies purchasing power parity, then  
 
d log p* = d log ( e
*
k p k)         ( 4 )
 
for all countries k∈{1,…., K}. 
 
Proof:  See Barnett (2003). 
 
Comparing (3) with (1), and (4) with (2), displays the sources of the complications in (1) 
and (2) caused by violations of purchasing power parity. 
5.2.  Multilateral Representative Agent over the Economic Union 
In this section, we define the concept of a multilateral representative agent.  In the next 
section, we define a unilateral representative agent over countries to be a representative 
agent who considers the same goods in different countries to be perfect substitutes, 
regardless of the country of residence of the purchaser or the country within which the 
good or asset is acquired.  The existence of a unilateral representative agent has been 
implicit in the existing studies using the “direct method” of aggregation over monetary 
assets in the euro area.  As we shall show, the existence of a unilateral representative 
  - 13 -agent requires extremely strong assumptions.  Without a homogeneous culture and the 
vast population migrations that could produce that uniformity, this assumption will not 
apply.  The existence of a multilateral representative agent requires far more reasonable 
assumptions.   
If tastes across countries do converge in the distant future, the convergence is more likely 
to be towards a homogeneous multilateral representative agent, which we shall define, 
rather than towards a unilateral representative agent.  A homogeneous multilateral 
representative agent recognizes the existence of country specific tastes, but equates those 
tastes across countries.  A unilateral representative agent does not recognize the 
relevancy of countries at all and thereby does not recognize the existence of country 
specific tastes.  Country specific utility functions cannot be factored out of the economic 
union’s tastes (i.e., weak separability of country tastes fails); and the country subscripts, j 
and k, disappear from the decision of the unilateral representative agent.  The allocation 
of goods across countries is indeterminate in that case. 
  5.2.1.  Multilateral Representative Agent with Heterogeneous Tastes 
We begin by defining relevant assumptions and produce the theory of a multilateral 
representative agent.  We show that the existence of a multilateral representative agent is 
a special case of our heterogeneous countries theory.  We further show that a 
homogeneous multilateral representative agent exists under stronger assumptions. 
As described in the previous section, our representative agent approach for aggregating 
over countries treats countries as already realized, so that variables and functions no 
longer are random.  Hence we can consider realized functional structure aggregated over 
realized countries.  The following assumption is needed, and begins to become weak only 
after the introduction of a common currency. 
Assumption 1:  Suppose there is convergence over the economic union in the following 
sense. Let there exist R = R(t) such that Rk = R(t) for all k∈{1,…., K} and all t. 
The existence of a representative agent is necessary and sufficient for the nonexistence of 
distribution effects.
11  Distribution effects introduce second moments and possibly higher 
order moments into demand functions aggregated over consumers.  The existence of such 
second and higher order moments in the macroeconomy can cause policy to influence 
distributions of income and wealth across consumers.  Assumption 1 rules out certain 
possible distribution effects.  Additional assumptions ruling out other sources of 
distribution effects will be needed as we consider further special cases. 
By its definition, the benchmark asset, unlike “monetary” assets, provides no services 
other than its investment rate of return, and hence cannot enter the utility function of an 
infinitely lived representative agent.
12  Therefore, differences in tastes across countries 
play no role in decisions regarding benchmark asset holdings by a representative agent 
                                                 
11 See Gorman (1953). 
12 See, e.g., Barnett and Serletis (2000, p. 53).  In the finite planning horizon case, the benchmark asset 
enters utility only in the terminal period to produce a savings motive to endow the next planning horizon. 
  - 14 -within the economic union.   For that reason, the existence of a common benchmark rate 
for all countries is necessary for a representative agent over countries.  A representative 
agent within the economic union would hold only the highest yielding of multiple 
possible benchmark assets.  This conclusion is not necessary in our thereby-more-general 
heterogeneous countries approach. 
With Assumption 1, we also can consider the following stronger assumption.  We assume 
that all K countries have already been drawn from their theoretical population of potential 
countries.  Then the tastes of the representative consumers in each country are realized 
and are no longer random.  The following assumption produces the existence of 
aggregator functions, (U, V, G), over the individual realized countries’ tastes, (uk, gk), for 
k∈{1,….,K}. 
Assumption 2a:  Assume that there exists a representative consumer over the economic 





1 m K m 1(t),….,xK(t)) is intertemporally weakly separable from 
( (τ),…., (τ),x 1 m K m 1(τ),….,xK(τ)) for all t ≠ τ, and also assume that monetary assets are 
weakly separable from consumer goods.  As defined in Section 1, xk is the vector of 
instantaneous per-capita goods consumption rates in country k relative to the population 
of country k.  Then skxk is the per-capita real consumption vector relative to total 
economic union population, H =  k
k1
H
= ∑ .  Since contemporaneous consumption of goods 
and services is weakly separable from future consumption, a contemporaneous category 





1 m ,…., sK
*
K m ), (s G

1x1,…., sKxK)],     (5a) 




Assumption 2b:  Assume further that consumption of monetary assets and goods are 
weakly separable among countries, so that the contemporaneous utility function has the 
blockwise weakly separable form  
U = U{V[s1u1( ),…., s
*
1 m KuK( )],G[s
*
K m 1g1(x1),…., sKgK(xK)]}.                   (5b) 
Assume that the functions V, G, uk, and gk do not change over time and are linearly 
homogeneous for all k∈{1,….,K}.
13  The dependency of uk and gk on k permits 
heterogeneity of tastes across countries.  In the next subsection, we shall explore the 
special case of homogeneity of tastes across countries. 
As in our heterogeneous agents approach, the subscript k identifies the country of 
residence of the owner of the asset and not necessarily the country within which the asset 
                                                 
13 The assumption that the functions do not move over time does not preclude subjective discounting of 
future utility within the integrand of the intertemporal utility integral. 
  - 15 -is purchased or located.  Hence, equation (5b) requires that the tastes that determine the 
utility functions, uk and gk, are those of the residents of country k, regardless of the 
country within which the residents have deposited their assets.  Note that equation (5a) 
does not require that tastes of consumer’s residing in country k exist independently of the 
tastes of consumers residing in other countries.  The existence of stable country-specific 
tastes, uk and gk, exist only under the stronger assumption (5b). 
Equation (5b) could equivalently be written as 
U = U{V[u1(s1
*
1 m ),…., uK(sK
*
K m )],G[g1(s1x1),…., gK(sKxK)]}, 
because of the linear homogeneity of the utility functions, uk and gk.  But we prefer the 
form of equation (5b), since it makes clear our ability to aggregate first within countries 









k M k( ), and the within-country 
consumer goods aggregates, X
k m
k = gk(xk).  Note that   and X k M k are in per capita terms 
relative to country k’s population.  We then can aggregate over countries to acquire the 
economic union’s monetary aggregate over countries, M* = V[s1u1( ),….,s 1 m KuK( )] 
= V[s
K m
1 1 M ,…., sK K M ], and the economic union’s consumer goods aggregate over 
countries, X = G[s1g1(x1),…., sKgK(xK)]  = G[s1X1,…., sKXK].  Note that M* and X are in 
per capita terms relative to total economic union population.  Our proofs below 
demonstrate the capability to aggregate recursively in that manner. 
Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b, let I = I(t) be the instantaneous rate of expenditure.  It 
is budgeted to t by the representative consumer in a prior stage intertemporal allocation.  
Then we can define the following contemporaneous, conditional decision at instant of 
time t. 




K m 1,…., xK) to  
maximize U{V[s1u1( ),…., s
*
1 m KuK( )],G[s
*
K m 1g1(x1), … , sKgK(xK)]} 














Definition 7:  We define a multilateral representative consumer to be an economic agent 
who solves Decision 1 under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b. 
Note that our definitions of real and nominal money balances have not changed from 
those in Section 1.  Nominal balances owned by residents of country k are deflated by   
to acquire real balances, where   is the unit cost function dual to the consumer goods 
quantity aggregator function, g
k p
k p
k(xk), within country k.  We are not yet accepting 
assumptions that would be sufficient for existence of a single consumer-price index that 
could be used to deflate nominal balances within all countries in the economic union to 
real balances in those countries.  Hence   is not independent of k.  Our economic union  k p
  - 16 -consumer-goods price aggregate, p*, is relevant to deflation of monetary balances only 
after monetary balances have been aggregated over countries.   
Observe that Assumption 1 does not require convergence of rates of return on all 
monetary assets across countries.  To produce the multilateral representative consumer, 
Assumption 1 requires only that consumers in all countries of the economic union have 
access to the same benchmark rate of return on pure investment.  We now consider the 
implications of a multilateral representative agent.  In the next section, we then focus on 
the case of a unilateral representative agent, requiring the adoption of very strong 
assumptions. 
The following lemmas now are immediate. 
Lemma 2:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b, the representative consumer’s allocation of 
I(t) over goods and monetary services will solve Decision 1. 
Proof:  Follows from known results on two stage budgeting, where the first stage is 
intertemporal.  One need only redefine the variables in the continuous time analog to 
Barnett (1978, section 3; 1980, section 3.1; or 1987, sections 2.1-2.2).          Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b, let Xk = gk(xk) be the exact consumer goods 
per-capita quantity aggregate over xk for country k, relative to the population of country 
k, and let X = G(s1X1, … , sKXK) be the exact consumer goods per capita quantity 
aggregate over countries, relative to total economic union population.  Then p  is the 
exact price dual to X
*
k
k, and P* is the exact price dual to X, where P* is defined such that 
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Proof:  The result regarding p
*
k  follows, since it was defined in Section 1 to be the true 
cost of living index of Xk.  The result on P* follows by a proof analogous to that of 
Theorem 2, since duality of P* and X implies, from factor reversal, that 
XP* =  .          ( 7 )  








Note that P*, defined by equation (6), and p*, defined by equation (2), are not the same.  
Both consumer price indexes are needed for different purposes, as we shall discuss 
further below.  Now consider the following decision, within which aggregation over 
consumer goods has already occurred. 





maximize U{V[s1u1( ),…., s
*
1 m KuK( )], X } 
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K m
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The following theorem establishes the connection between Decisions 1 and 2. 




K m 1,…., xK) solve 
Decision 1, and let X and P* be defined as in Lemma 3.  Then ( ,….,  , X) will 
solve Decision 2. 
1 m K m
Proof:  Follows from Lemma 3 and well known results on two stage budgeting.  Q.E.D. 
Theorem 5 permits us to concentrate on aggregation over monetary assets within 
countries and then over countries, while using a quantity and price aggregate for 
consumer goods.  Theorem 5 also demonstrates our need for the P* price index in the 
prior aggregation over consumer goods. 
In Decision 3, we now define a “second stage” decision, in which funds preallocated to 
monetary-services expenditure within the economic union are allocated over countries.  
In Decision 4, we then define a “third stage” decision, in which funds preallocated to 
monetary-services expenditure within the each country are allocated over assets in the 
country.   
Let  for each k∈{1,…., K} be as in Definition 1.  We then can define the following 
decision.  
k Π







1 M ,…., sK
*
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Decision 4:  For each k∈{1,…., K} choose   to 
*
k m





kk ′ m π =  Π
*
k M k. 
The following two corollaries to Theorem 5 relate to Decisions 3 and 4. 
  - 18 -Corollary 1 to Theorem 5:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b, let ( ,….,  ,X) solve 





1,…., ∏K) as 
in Definition 1.  Then ( ,….,  ) will solve Decision 3, where  = u









1 M K M k M k( ) for all 
k∈{1, … , K}. 
k m
Proof:  Follows from well known results on two stage budgeting.      Q.E.D. 
Corollary 2 to Theorem 5:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b, let ( ,….,  , X) solve 





k M k( ) for all k∈{1, … , K}. Define Π k m k as in Definition 1.  
Then   also will solve Decision 4 for all k∈{1, … , K}.  k m
Proof:  Follows from well known results on two stage budgeting and a simple proof by 
contradiction.  Suppose  = u k M k( ), but   does not solve Decision 4 for all k∈{1, … 
, K}.  Then ( ,….,  , X) cannot solve Decision 2.   Q.E.D. 
k m k m
1 m K m
Decision 4 defines the representative consumers assumed to exist within countries in 
Section 2.  Under the assumptions in Definition 7 for the existence of a multilateral 
representative consumer, Corollary 2 to Theorem 5 proves that the decisions of the 
representative consumers in Section 2 are nested as conditional decisions within the 
decision of the multilateral representative consumer.  Hence our results in Section 2 can 
be used to aggregate within countries, regardless of whether aggregation over countries is 
by our heterogeneous countries approach or by our multilateral representative consumer 
approach.   
After the aggregation within countries is complete, Corollary 1 to Theorem 5 
demonstrates that Decision 3 can be used to aggregate over countries, if we accept the 
assumptions necessary for the existence of a multilateral representative agent.  The 
monetary quantity aggregator function for aggregation over countries then is V, and a 
Divisia index can be used to track V in the usual manner.   
Observe that Decision 4 would be unaffected, if the vector of within-country user costs πk 
and the aggregate within-country user cost Πk were changed to real user costs, since all 
that would be involved is the division of each constraint by  .  Hence that constraint 
would continue to hold, if all values in the constraint were in real terms.   
k p
But observe that in Decisions 2 and 3, the consumer price index P* on the right hand side 
of equation (8) is not the same as the consumer price index   needed to deflate the user 
costs on the left hand side to real value.  In addition, the consumer price index   used to 
deflate each term on the left hand side is different for each k∈{1, … , K}.  Hence the 
constraint would be broken, if all variables on both sides of the constraint were replaced 
by real values.  This would amount to dividing each term by a different price index.  Also 
recall that conversion of   to nominal balances requires multiplication by  , which is 
different for each country k. 
k p
k p
k m k p
  - 19 -The following illustration can further clarify the need for two price indexes in modeling.  
Consider the following decision using the exact aggregates both over monetary assets and 
goods within the economic union. 
Decision 5:  Choose (M*,X) to  
maximize U(M*,X)  
subject to M*Π + XP* = I. 
The solution will be of the form 
** * M*





* .   (9a) 
But by Lemma 1 and the homogeneity of degree zero of demand, we equivalently can 
write: 





























As can be seen from equations (9b) and (9c), there is no way to remove the simultaneous 
dependence of the solution demand function systems upon the two price indexes, P* and 
p*.  The form of the demand system in (9a) is in terms of nominal total expenditure 
(“income”), I.  The form of the demand system in (9b) is in terms of real income relative 
to p* aggregate prices.  The form in (9c) is in terms of real income relative to P* 
aggregate prices.  None of the three possible forms results in either p* or P* canceling 
out.  In addition, Lemma 1 requires that conversion of M* to nominal balances must be 
relative to p* prices. 
The following theorem establishes the relationship between our heterogeneous countries 
approach and our multilateral representative agent approach. 
Theorem 6:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b, let ( ,….,  ) solve Decision 3, and 





  - 20 -d log M* = d log V(s1
*
1 M ,…., sK
*
K M ). 
Proof:  Follows from the exact tracking of the Divisia index in continuous time.  Q.E.D. 
Our multilateral representative agent theory produces conditions under which an 
economic (rather than statistical) monetary aggregate exists over countries.  When an 
economic monetary aggregator function, V, exists over countries, Theorem 6 shows that 
our index number M*, introduced in Definition 4, will exactly track the theoretical 
aggregate.  In particular, we have demonstrated that our heterogeneous agents approach 
for aggregating over countries reduces to the multilateral approach under assumptions 1, 
2a, and 2b, since both approaches then produce the same monetary aggregate, M*, over 
countries.  In addition, Πk and   defined in Definition 5 will remain dual to M*, since 
the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 remain valid under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b.    
*
                                                
k Π
We have demonstrated at all stages of aggregation that our multilateral representative 
agent approach is nested within our heterogeneous countries approach as a special case 
under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b.  Theorem 6 is the result at the level of aggregation over 
countries, while Corollary 2 to Theorem 5 is the result for aggregation within countries. 
Also observe that since the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 remain valid under our additional 
assumptions in this section, it follows that we must continue to deflate nominal M 
aggregated over countries to real M* using p*, not P*.  The correct dual to aggregate real 
consumption X is P*, which should be used to deflate nominal to real consumption 
expenditure.  Regarding the computation of P* and its possible use as an inflation target, 
see Diewert (2002).  It is important to recognize that p* and P* both play important roles 
in this theory, and neither is an acceptable substitute for the other.
14  These conclusions 
hold in both our heterogeneous countries approach and in the multilateral representative 
agents special case acquired when the benchmark rate is the same for all countries in the 
economic union. 
  5.2.2.  Multilateral Representative Agent with Homogeneous Tastes 
We now proceed to the far more restrictive case of a homogeneous multilateral 
representative agent who imputes identical tastes to the residents of all countries in the 
economic union.  An initial necessary assumption is Assumption 1.  As shown by 
Theorem 7 below, the seeming paradox of the existence of two consumer price indices---
p* to deflate nominal money balances to real balances and P* to deflate nominal 
consumption expenditure to real aggregate consumption---disappears under the following 
additional important assumption. 
 
14 Although perhaps somewhat surprising, the need for two different consumer price indexes is not entirely 
without precedent.  The theory that produces the relative price version of Theil’s (1971, p. 578, eq. 6.19) 
Rotterdam consumer demand system model also requires two consumer price indexes:  the Divisia price 
index with average share weights to deflate nominal income to real income and the Frisch consumer price 
index with marginal budget share weights to deflate nominal to real relative prices.  But that Rotterdam 
model phenomenon has a different source. 
  - 21 -Assumption 3:  Suppose there is convergence over the economic union in the following 





k p( t ) k(t))] = 
d
dt
[log  ]             ( 1 0 )   ˆ P(t)
for all k∈{1,…., K} and all t. 
The following theorem is immediate. 
Theorem 7:  Under Assumption 3, the following equation holds for all nonnegative 
(e1,…., eK) and all nonnegative ( ,….,  ): 
* *
ˆ ˆ
1 p K p
d log p*( e
*
1 p 1,…., e
*
K p K) = d log P*( e
*
1 p 1,…., e
*
K p K). 
Proof:  By equation (10), d log ( e
*
k p k) = d log   for all k∈{1,…., K} and all t.  Hence  
d log p* = d log   by equation (2), and d log P* = d log   by equation (10).  So d log p* 
=  d  log  P*.          Q.E.D. 
ˆ P
P P
We now consider further the case of a homogeneous multilateral representative agent, but 
first we shall need the following lemma. 
Lemma 4:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, 2b, and 3, there exists g such that gk = g for all 
k∈{1,.…., K} so that tastes for consumer goods are identical across countries. 
Proof:  By equation (10), it follows that d log [ e
*
k p( t ) k(t)] = d log  [ ] kk ˆ P (t)e (t) p  for all 
k∈{1,.…., K}.  Hence the same consumer goods price aggregator function   applies for 




k, is dual to the 
consumer goods price aggregator function.  Hence the consumer goods quantity 
aggregator functions gk must also be independent of k.       Q.E.D. 
To move further towards the existence of a homogeneous multilateral representative 
consumer, we also need the following assumption, which is analogous to Assumption 3. 
Assumption 4:  Suppose that convergence over the economic union results in the 
existence of   such that  Π
d
dt
[ log (∏k(t)ek(t))] = 
d
dt
 [log  ˆ Π(t)] 
for all k∈{1,.…., K} and all t.   
Clearly under this assumption, it follows from Definition 5 that  ˆ Π(t) = Π(t) for all t.  The 
following lemma depends heavily upon Assumption 4. 
  - 22 -Lemma 5:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, 2b, and 4, there exists u such that uk = u for all 
k∈{1,….,K}, so that tastes for monetary services are identical across countries. 
Proof:  Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.         Q.E.D. 
The form of Decision 1 now is as follows. 
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Observation 1:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, 2b, 3, and 4, the solutions to Decisions 1 and 
1a will be the same, as is evident from Lemmas 4 and 5.  Because of the homogeneity of 
tastes across countries in Decision 1a, we have the following definition. 
Definition 8:  We define a homogeneous multilateral representative agent to be an 
economic agent who solves Decision 1a under Assumptions 1, 2a, 2b, 3, and 4.   
Observe that despite the homogeneity of tastes across countries, the decision remains 
multilateral, as a result of the assumption of blockwise weak separability of tastes across 
countries.  That separability assumption produces existence of within-country tastes, u,  
independent of consumption in other countries.   The fact that the tastes are identical for 
all countries in the economic union does not negate the existence of those tastes, u. 
In econometric studies, there could be reason to investigate convergence of the general 
multilateral representative consumer towards the homogeneous multilateral 
representative agent.   But for data construction purposes, we see no advantage to 
adopting the homogeneous multilateral representative agent model.  We have shown that 
the general multilateral representative agent model can be used to construct aggregates 
recursively, first within countries and then across countries.  When producing the 
aggregates within countries, there is not benefit to imposing uniformity of tastes across 
countries. 
In the next section, we explore the unilateral representative agent model that would 
produce a large gain in data construction simplification, but only under a very strong 
assumption that is not likely to be reasonable within the near future, if ever. 
5.3.  Existence of a Unilateral Representative Agent over the Economic Union 
A unilateral representative agent considers the same goods and assets to be perfect 
substitutes, regardless of the country within which the goods and assets are purchased and 
regardless of the country within which the purchaser resides.  Under this assumption, our 
subscripts j and k will be irrelevant to the tastes of the unilateral representative agent.  
  - 23 -Only the subscript i will matter, since countries, and thereby country subscripts, will be 
irrelevant to the decision.    
We no longer can accept Assumption 2b, but instead will have to make a much stronger, 
but nonnested, assumption.  Assumption 2b assumed weak separability among countries 
of residence of consumers.  But a unilateral representative agent neither recognizes the 
country of residence of a consumer nor the country within which a good or asset was 
acquired.  Hence tastes specific to a country no longer exist.  It is important to recognize 
the fundamental difference between the homogeneous multilateral representative 
consumer and the unilateral representative consumer.  The former imputes identical tastes 
to each country’s residents, but does recognize the existence of different countries and the 
existence of the identical tastes, u, within each country.  But the unilateral representative 
consumer does not impute existence of weakly separable tastes to the residents of any 
country in the economic union.   
Since we no longer can assume weak separability among countries, we shall have to 
rewrite Decision 1 as: 
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Hence we now replace Assumption 2b with the following much stronger assumption, 
which is neither necessary nor sufficient for Assumption 2b.  
Assumption 5:  Let m* =  , and x =  .  Suppose there exists linearly 













V V 1 1 m , … , sK K m ), where   is as defined in 
equation (5a) . Then for any i, all monetary assets of that type are perfect substitutes, 
regardless of the country within which they are located or the country in which the owner 





G 1x1,….,sKxK), where G

 is as defined in equation (5a).  Hence for any i, all consumer 
goods of that type are perfect substitutes, regardless of the country within which they are 
located or the country in which the owner resides.  Further assume that there exist π(t) 
and p(t) such that πkj(t)ek(t) = π(t) and pk(t)ek(t) = p(t) for all k∈{1,.….,K}, 
j∈{1,.….,K+Z}, and all t. 
The assumptions πkj(t)ek(t) = π(t) and pk(t)ek(t) = p(t) are needed to avoid corner 
solutions allocating no consumption to residents of some countries.  Otherwise, with 
perfect substitutability across countries of residence, all consumption of each good by the 
unilateral representative agent would be allocated to residents of the country having the 
  - 24 -lowest price of that good.  Under Assumption 5, Decision 1b now becomes Decision 1c, 
defined as follows. 
Decision 1c:  Choose (m*, x) to 
maximize U[ (m*), (x)]  ˆ V ˆ G
subject to  *′ m π + x ′ p = I. 
The following theorem demonstrates that Decision 1c is the decision of a unilateral 
representative consumer for the economic union. 




K m 1, … , xK) solve Decision 1b, and let m* and x be as 
defined in Assumption 5.  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 5, it follows that m* and x will 
solve Decision 1c. 
Proof:  Observe that there is no need to include Assumptions 3 or 4 in this theorem, since 
Assumption 5 implies Assumptions 3 and 4.  The result follows directly from the 
theorem’s assumptions and the definitions of m* and x.           Q. E. D. 
We thereby are led to the following definition.   
Definition 9:  Under Assumptions 1, 2a, and 5, we define a unilateral representative 
consumer to be an economic agent who solves Decision 1c. 
Note that a unilateral economic agent recognizes no differences in tastes among 
countries, either for the owner’s country of residence or for the country within which the 
asset or good is located or purchased.  But in a more fundamental sense, observe that in 
general it is impossible to factor out of  (m*) or  (x) the consumption or asset 
holdings of residents of any country.  Hence country specific separable subfunction u
ˆ ˆ
                                                
V G
k or 
gk, do not exist, and hence separable tastes of residents of a country do not exist.  In fact 
for any solution for (m*,x) to Decision 1c, the allocation of asset holdings and 
consumption expenditure to countries is indeterminate.  Assumptions 3 and 4 have been 
omitted from Theorem 8, because of redundancy with Assumption 5.  But Assumption 
2b, which also has been omitted, is not redundant, but rather is omitted since it 
contradicts Assumption 5.  The unilateral representative agent exists under much stronger 
assumptions than the multilateral representative agent.  But the unilateral representative 
agent is not a nested special case of the multilateral representative agent, whether in its 
general or homogeneous form.
15
 
15 Decision 1c is the representative agent model previously used in some studies to aggregate within the 
euro area.  But the required convergence conditions, Assumptions 1, 2a, and 5 and the implied 
Assumptions 3 and 4, are clearly very strong, since they imply decision independence of the country of 
residence of purchasers and of the country of location of the purchase.  Rather than requiring identical 
tastes of consumers among all countries in the economic union, as in the homogeneous multilateral 
representative agent case, the unilateral representative agent case implies nonexistence of separable tastes 
or cultures for any country, through irrelevancy of the location of the purchaser or of the purchased good or 
asset.  
  - 25 -The multilateral representative agent model of Decision 1 is far more reasonable, 
requiring only Assumptions 1, 2a, and 2b.  But we see from Theorem 6 that our 
heterogeneous agents approach would produce the same results as the multilateral 
representative agent theory, if the necessary conditions for existence of a multilateral 
representative agent were satisfied. 
6.  Interest Rate Aggregation 
Since interest rates play important roles in policy, it could be useful to compute the 
interest rate aggregate that is dual to the Divisia monetary quantity index.  We show that 
the correct interest rate aggregate is not the one in common use by central banks, and we 
view the commonly used interest rate aggregates to be unacceptable.  In particular we 
provide the correct formula for aggregating interest rates jointly over monetary assets and 
over countries. 
 
 Let  k r  be the dual aggregate interest rate for country k.  It follows from Definition 1 and 
the definition of the vector of component user costs prices, π
*
k,  that Rk -  k r=   , where 







k Π k).  Hence  k r  easily can be computed from  k r =  R k -  .  In discrete time 




ki π k-rki)/(1+Rk), it follows that (Rk -  k r) / ( 1 + R k)=  , with 
*
k Π k r  being computed 
by solving that equation.   
 
After aggregating over countries, the interest rate that is dual to M* is similarly easy to 
compute, if the same benchmark rate applies to all countries.  In that case, which we 
believe not likely to be applicable prior to the introduction of a common currency, our 
heterogeneous agents approach to aggregating over countries becomes mathematically 
equivalent to our multilateral representative agent approach.   
 
Let R = R(t) be the common benchmark rate applying to all countries in the economic 
union, and let  r= r (t) be the interest rate aggregate dual to M*.  In continuous time, it 
follows that R -  r =   , where 
* Π
* Π = ( )
* t Π  =  ( )
** *
1 ,...., K Π ΠΠ .  Hence  r  easily can be 
computed from  r =  R  -   .  Analogously in discrete time, it follows that (R - 
* Π r) / ( 1  +  R )  
=  ,  with 
* Π r  being computed by solving that equation.
16   
 
Note that our aggregation-theoretic interest-rate aggregates are not the interest-rate 
weighted averages often used in this literature. 
7.  Divisia Second Moments 
Our use of the stochastic approach to aggregation lends itself naturally to the computation 
of Divisia second moments, although in the above sections we have provided only the 
                                                 
16 In the heterogeneous agents approach, there does not exist a common benchmark rate that can be imputed 
to all countries.  Under those circumstances, the aggregation theoretic method of producing the interest rate 
aggregate can be found in Barnett (2000, p. 278, equation 5).   
  - 26 -Divisia first moments.  In this tradition, the “Divisia index” is synonymous with the 
Divisia growth rate mean.  We believe that the Divisia growth rate variance could be 
especially useful for exploring distribution effects of policy within an economic union 
and progress towards convergence.  We propose below some potentially useful Divisia 
growth rate variances.  Conversion of our continuous time formulas to their discrete time 
version is analogous to that available for the within-country Divisia quantity and user 
cost growth rate variances in Barnett and Serletis (2000, p. 172, eqs. 4 and 7). 
We believe that the Divisia growth rate variances could be especially useful when 
computed about the Divisia means of the following growth rates:  (i) the monetary 
quantity growth rates, d log M and d log M*, in Definition 4, (ii) the Divisia means of the 
user cost price growth rates, d log Π and d log Π*, in Definition 5, and (iii) the inflation 
growth rate, d log p*, in equation (2) or the inflation growth rate, d log P*, in equation 
(6).  Repeating those Divisia mean formulas and producing the analogous Divisia 
variances, we have the following formulas. 
The Divisia growth rate means are in Definitions 3, 4, and 5 and equation (6).  
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An additional potentially useful Divisia growth rate variance is that of the monetary 
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= ∑ k . 
The Divisia monetary services growth rate variances, K and K*, and the Divisia 
monetary-services expenditure-share growth-rate variance, Ψ, are measures of the 
dispersion of monetary service growth rates across countries in nominal and real terms, 
respectively, while the Divisia inflation rate variances, G and GM, are measures of the 
dispersion of inflation rates across countries.  Increasing values of K, K*, Ψ, and G over 
time are indications of growth in the distribution effects of monetary policy over the 
countries of the economic union.  Decreases in K, K*, Ψ, and G over time are indications 
of convergence towards more uniform effects of policy over the economic union.  If 
variations in K, K*, and Ψ tend to precede those of G, then there is an implication of 
causality.  The converse could indicate that policy is accommodating other causal factors.   
  - 27 -The Divisia growth rate variances, J and J*, are measures of the progress of 
harmonization of financial markets over countries and hence are less directly connected 
with monetary policy and more directly connected with structural progress in the 
unification of money markets over the economic union. 
8.  Conclusions 
We advocate use of Barnett’s (1980) representative agent approach to Divisia 
aggregation within countries and then our heterogeneous countries approach to 
aggregation over countries.  Our stochastic approach to aggregation over countries lends 
itself naturally to computation of Divisia second moments.  We advocate computation of 
Divisia variance growth rates about the Divisia means across countries.  Those Divisia 
second moments could provide useful information about the distribution effects of policy 
and about progress towards convergence over an economic union, such as the EMU. 
We define and produce the theory relevant to a third very restrictive case, which we call 
the unilateral representative agent approach.  This approach, which we show to be 
implied by some early studies of euro-area monetary aggregation, may be relevant to 
aggregation over states or provinces of a single country, but not likely for aggregation 
over different countries within an economic union. 
With the heterogeneous countries or multilateral representative agent approach, we find 
the need for two different consumer price indexes:  one for use in deflating nominal to 
real monetary balances after aggregation over countries, and one for deflating nominal to 
real consumer goods expenditure.  The imputation of either index to both uses would 
produce a serious specification error.  Only under our very restrictive homogeneous 
multilateral representative agent assumptions or the even-more-restrictive unilateral 
representative agent assumptions do the growth rates of the two consumer price indexes 
become equal.   
The choice among our nested assumption structures for aggregation must be consistent 
with the assumptions made in producing the models within which the data is to be used.  
In fact it is attainment of that internal consistency that is the primary objective of index 
number and aggregation theory.  Without that coherence between aggregator function 
structure and the econometric models within which aggregates are embedded, stable 
structure can appear to become unstable. 
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